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Abstract: The goal of any professional athlete is to receive a multi-year contract that
guarantees them a salary for multiple years. However, a concern that fans, coaches and
owners all share is that when a player receives a multi-year contract they may have a
strong incentive to shirk. Shirking is when a player purposely does not perfonn to the
best of his ability and may occur when a player has a guaranteed salary. The goa� of this
paper is to determine if a Major League Baseball player with a multi-year contract will
show any pattern of shirking throughout the contract. Each of the fifty players has a four
year contract and the theories of moral hazard and asymmetric infonnation suggest that a
player may shirk during the contract until the last year. Descriptive statistics and OLS
regression results provide evidence that Major League Baseball players with four year
contracts do not have a pattern of shirking. Job security, above market wages and
monitoring may be the important concepts explaining why there is no evidence for
shirking.

I. Introduction

"The experience of individual clubs, and the industry as a whole, is that for
whatever reason, the player's performance is not the same following the signing of a new
multi-year contract." This quote from Dan O'Brien, the fonner vice president of
negotiations for the Cleveland Indians, represents the common perception that many
people, from owners to fans, havc of current Major League Baseball (MLB) players
(Berri and Krautmann, 2006). Multi-year contracts provide a player with a strong sense
of security which people such as Dan O'Brien believe may also result in the player
shirking.
Shirking is when a player purposely does not perform to the best of his ability and
may occur when a player has a guaranteed salary. A longer contract gives a player more
0ppoliunity to shirk without losing his salary. A player is considered shirking when he
does not put all of his effort into the training, workouts, or even his games. He can shirk
during the season as well as during the off-season. A benefit of shirking for a player is
that the player may extend his career because he is not putting his body through as
extreme measures. Also, shirking during some part of his contract and not others may
give the appearance that a player is improving or a better player than he really is.
However, even though there are benefits of shirking to the player, fans and owners have
an interest in making sure a player is not shirking. Since the owners and fans are
spending so much money on the player they want to ensure that they are receiving the
best return for their investment. In other words, owners and fans expect MLB players to
perfonn to their potential in every game.

The focus of this paper is to see if a multi-year contract provides an incentive for
a MLB player to shirk. Multi-year contracts were not common in MLB until after free
agency was developed in 1977. Today these contracts are rarely used for a player who
has below average skills, little experience, or is nearing his retirement age. However
teams still offer these types of contracts because it helps the team avoid a high amount of
player turnover. A multi-year contract is important because teams have to pay the player
the amount specified in the contract even if the player does not meet performance
expectations, becomes injured and cannot play, or is released from the team (Meltzer,
2005 and Dinerstein, 2007). This study uses productivity measures to determine if a
player actually does shirk when he has a multi-year contract.
The negotiation status of a player affects the ability of teams and players to
negotiate contracts. Contract lengths for players that have been in the majors for less
than six years are not detetmined by free negotiations. Owners have an advantage over
the players during these first six years since players are not able to freely move around
the league. As a result, the data in this paper only includes players that have been in the
league for more than six years and are thus classified as "free agents."
Moral hazard and asymmetric information theories, as well as human capital
theories, are the underlying theories for evaluating the effect of a multi-year contract on a
player's productivity. These theories may create different incentives for a player to
decide if he wants to shirk or not. The hypothesis for this paper is that the concepts of
moral hazard and asymmetric infonnation cause a player to shirk during the middle years
of a contract until the last year when a player's productivity begins to increase. To test
this hypothesis an OLS regression is run with the productivity of a player as the
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dependent variable and each contract year (as well as control variables) as the
independent variables.
However, management may have discovered ways to prevent a MLB player from
shirking. By using techniques, such as incentives and monitoring, owners could
successfully thwart a player's attempt to shirk. If the owners are successful then this
paper will not tind the pattern suggested by the theory.
This paper continues by first addressing related literature (section II) and moving
on to a discussion of the theory (section III). A section discussing the data in this paper
(section IV) and a section addressing the empirical model (section V) follow the
discussion of the theory. Finally, there is a discussion of the results (section VI) and
conclusions (section VII).

II. Review of Related Empirical Studies

Using economic theories to analyze professional sports, particularly baseball, has
become very popular over the last few decades. Multiple studies have been conducted
that address the contracts, salaries and perfonnance of MLB players. Some of these
studies look at how previous performances affect the contract length and the salaries that
the players receive (Meltzer, 2005; Dinerstein, 2007; and Tarman, 2005). These studies
look at how owners evaluate players and examine contract detennination from the
perspective of the teams. These are solid starting places for this study.
The common focus of contract studies is the relationship between perfonnance
and the salary or contract length of a player. In these studies the dependent variable is
contract length or salary, and the independent variable is the productivity of the player.
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One of these studies was perfonned by Josh Meltzer (2005), who tested if perfonnance is
a significant predictor of a salary for a MLB player. His regression results demonstrated
that performance was a significant predictor, which confinned his hypothesis and the
conclusion of other researchers. These results mean that the better player receives a
longer contract and this often leads to a salary premium on top of the length of the
received contract (Meltzer, 2005). Therefore, young players that are improving and
perfonning well receive longer contracts.
Krautmann and Oppenheimer (2002) perfonned a similar study linking contract
length to the salaries of MLB players. The authors perfonned an OLS regression and
detennined that contract lenf,rth is positively related to wages. Earlier in their study,
Krautmann and Oppenheimer detennined, based on their work and previous studies, that
superior players tend to receive higher salaries. Consequently, contract length has a
positive relationship to wages, since the best players receive the longest contracts in
addition to the highest salaries. These studies are very important to my research because
they provide proof that a strong relationship exists between contract length and the
perfonnance of MLB players. This paper is furthering the existing research on this issue
by determining whether productivity varies in a predictable way over the course of a
multi-year contract.
Similar to my study, many studies in economic literature have used productivity
measures as dependent variables. Some common measurements of a player's
productivity are the slugging percentage, the on base percentage (OBP), and the on base
percentage plus slugging (OPS) of a player (Krautmann 1990; Dinerstein, 2007; Maxcy,
2004; Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 2002; and Tannan, 2005). The OBP is the
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percentage of times a player successfully reaches base without the other team making an
error. The slugging percentage is the total number of bases that a player receives per at
bat (Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 2002). For example, if a player hits a home run he is
credited with four bases. The OPS adds these two measures of productivity together and
is often viewed as the best measure of productivity. Two possible issues associated with
OPS are that the statistic does not address all offensive statistics available to a player and
it weights each offensive statistic the same. Equivalent Average (EqA) is a recently
developed measure that represents the total offensive value per out for a player. EqA is
slightly more comprehensive than OPS and it weights certain offensive statistics
differently. OPS may not be as accurate as EqA because some offensive statistics may be
more valuable than others. The complex fonnulas for EqA and OPS are presented in
Section IV.
Naturally, there are important variables to control for when evaluating a player's
productivity. One of these variables that these studies address is the number of injury
free games. When a player is injured he is not able to participate in games which
decreases his productivity. A similar conclusion that papers on contract length reach is
that a player that has a multi-year contract tends to be on the disabled list more than a
player with a short-term contract. The job security that a player receives with a multi
year contract will adversely affect the willingness of a player to play with an injury.
(BetTi and Krautmann, 2006; Lehn, 1984). In fact, as the number of years in the contract
increase the number of days that a player spends on the disabled list increases by twenty
five percent (Krautmann, 1990; Lehn, 1984). A player with a multi-year contract is more
willing to reveal his injuries to his team than a player that has a one year contract and he
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is also less likely to rehabilitate as quickly as a player with a one year contract (Lehn,
1984). B eni and Krautmann used games played as proxy to account for the effect of
injury on a player's productivity. I choose to also use games played to account for
injuries sustained by a player during the period of his contract.
Games played can also be used to account for any on-the-job training that a player
receives. On-the-job training provides a worker with more experience and therefore
makes the worker more productive. A worker becomes more productive because on-the
job training will increase the worker's general human capital as well as specific human
capital (Strober, 1990). By playing more games a player is able to increase baseball
skills as well as leam specific techniques that a team likes their players to have (i.e. base
running strategies). Another aspect of training that a player will receive when he plays
games is that he leams the strengths and weaknesses of his team. By knowing these
strengths and weaknesses a player can adjust his play to complement them and give the
team a better chance of winning. Therefore, a higher level of games played should cause
a player to have a higher productivity and represents the contribution of a player to his
team (Maxcy, 2002).
However, the games played variable has an element of ambiguity as well. The
games played variable may also ref1ect any shirking that a player is doing. For example,
a player may decide to shirk by playing fewer games and therefore his number of games
played during that year has decreased. As a result, it is dif1icult to determine if the
amount of games a player has participated in is due to injury or shirking.
Two other control variables in my study are dummy variables to represent if a
player changed teams when he signed his multi-year contract and if incentives were built
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into the contract. An incentive will likely cause a player to be more productive than he
otherwise would have been if the incentive was not offered because he wants to have the
extra money or security that the incentive provides. When a player is a free agent and is
discussing a new contract, the team that he was previously with will have more
information than other teams. Due to this lack of information the player's new team may
offer him too good of a contract since the team does not necessarily know how well the
player will actually perfonn or why the previous team has not asked the player to return
(Pindyck, 2005; Berri and Krautmann, 2006). This suggests that a lemon market is
present in baseball and the resulting asymmetric infonnation causes teams to be unaware
of a player's true productivity.
There were many more variables that these studies included that I have elected to
not use in my study. Some of these variables include team chemistry, attitude, hustle,
and intelligence (Maxcy, 2004). The productivity of a player will be affected by how
well he works with his teammates and how well he knows the sport of baseball.
Perhaps the most impOliant variable not included in this study is the ability of a player to
shirk during the off-season as presented by Berri and Krautmann (2006). If a player does
not take care of himself or prepare himself for the season he will not be as productive as
he could be. While, each of these variables could have a positive effect on how well a
player will perform they are difficult to quantify. As a result, these variables are not
included in my empirical model.
The negotiation status of a player atTects the type of contract the player will be
offered. One status of a MLB player is that they are eligible for arbitration. A player
becomes eligible for arbitration after three years in the MLB (Kahn, 1993). When a
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player is eligible for arbitration he can sign a new contract but he can only sign with his
cun-ent team. Arbitration gives a player the chance to negotiate for a higher salary but he
cannot leave the team (Tarman, 2005).

Salary disputes under arbitration are settled by

the decision of a neutral arbitrator. A player is eligible for free agency atter six years in
the MLB (Kahn, 1993). Free agency allows a player to sign with any team in the league
so he does not have to remain with the team he is cun-ently on. Andrew Tarman states
that because the draft and arbitration exist, " . . . all players in baseball are not in a truly
competitive market. " (1993). In his results, Kahn discovers that free agency will raise
contract duration (Kahn, 1993). This is due to the fact that free agency puts extra risk on
a team and multi-year contracts will help to mitigate it (Maxcy, 2004). Therefore a
player that is in the draft or arbitration stages of his career is not acting independently of
the team when contracts are negotiated. As a result, only free agents who have been in
the MLB for at least six years are included in my sample.

III. Theory

The goal of MLB owners is to create the best possible team. In order to
accomplish this they have to find the best players and attract them to their team. If an
owner signs one of the better players, or a star player, to his team he wants to make sure
he stays as long as possible due to market uncertainty. Market uncertainty refers to how
easy it will be for the finn to find a worker equivalent to or better than the cun-ent
worker. Maxcy (2004) found that market uncertainty will increase the chance of a player
receiving a multi-year contract. This would be because teams protect themselves against
the risk of not being able to replace the skill level of the player. This is especially true for
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a star player. A star player is very difficult to replace with a player that has similar
abilities. In other words, Maxcy found that the player who receives a long tenn contract
is least likely to be replaced (Meltzer, 2005). Maxcy (2002) states, "Maxcy (1996) finds
evidence that long-term contracts are awarded judiciously and primarily to those players
who have demonstrated consistent and superior perfOlmance." Market uncertainty drives
the owners desire to offer multi-year contracts. These contracts protect the owners from
having constant turnover and from losing their star players (Krautmann, 1990). A player
will agree to these long-tenn contracts because they are a source of guaranteed income
and give the player some job security.
However, the owner cannot relax completely once a �layer has signed a multi
year contract. In addition to market uncertainty an owner has to consider a concept called
productive unceliainty. Productive uncertainty is when an owner is unsure of how well
the player will perfonn on the job in the future (Maxcy, 2004). Owners cannot know the
player's exact productivity each year so they fonn an estimate based on his previous
perfonnances (Krautmann, 1990). Production uncertainty under a long-term contract
provides the opportunity for the player to shirk if he believes it is beneficial to him.
Once a player receives the multi-year contract, and therefore a guaranteed income
for multiple years, the player may begin to demonstrate moral hazard (Allen and Lueck,
2001). Moral hazard occurs when an individual's behavior will change because he/she
has insurance (Pindyck, 2005; Chiappori, 2002). With the insurance of a multi-year
contract the individual is less likely to take necessary precautions. When it comes to
baseball players, the moral hazard concept suggests that a player will not put in as much
effort into preparing for the season or possibly even during the season due to the
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insurance of his contract. The player has less incentive to devote his time to getting
better or working hard.
In order to make sure that a player does have the motivation to work hard and put
forth his maximum effort an owner can work an incentive into the player's contract (Berri
and Krautmann, 2006; Strober, 1990). Examples of incentives include bonuses for
becoming a most valuable player (for the entire league and playoff series), becoming an
all-star, receiving a Gold Glove, or being a Silver-Slugger. These incentives will be
offered to the player with the best opportunity to shirk. A star player will have the best
opportunity to shirk because his potential productivity can be very high. This gives the
player a lot of opportunity to shirk and still have his actual productivity be at the level the
owner is looking for. In order to avoid this situation, the owner can work in incentives
into the star player's contract which will encourage him not to shirk and perform closer to
his potential productivity. Chiappori and Salanie (2002) found that these incentives
successfully encourage a worker to maximize hislher effort so the incentives in a MLB
player's contract should encourage the player to maximize his human capital.
Human capital is made up of skills or knowledge that will produce income for a
worker (McConnell, 2009). Anything that a worker does to increase his/her productivity
is considered an investment in human capital. For a baseball player, an example of
investment in his human capital is training. Training consists of physical and labor inputs
that will make him a better player by increasing skill level and thus increasing human
capital. This investment in human capital therefore creates productivity potential
(McConnell, 2009). When the player puts more time and effort into training and other
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investments in human capital, he is increasing his chance of receiving a multi-year
contract (Baker, 1988).
However, training is a perfect opportunity for a player to shirk. Each player will
detennine the total amount of effort that maximizes his utility and for some a guaranteed
salary may cause them to have higher utility if they put in less effort (Marburger, 2003).
A player has to put in effort in the weight room, during practice, and even to his diet in
order to fully reach his productivity potential. If a player does not do these things,
patiicularly during the off-season, his performance during the season will be weakened
(Berri and Krautmann, 2006). The income effect may be a strong contributor to the
decrease in the player's investment to his human capital. When he signs a multi-year
contract, a player is getting a higher income which could cause him to choose leisure over
working. As a result, the player may purposely spend less time conditioning himself for
his season (BelTi and Krautmann, 2006; Krautmann, 1990; Baker, 1988).
When either the owner or player does not have complete infonnation about a
situation there is asymmetric infonnation (Pinkyck, 2005; Chiappori, 2002). B y knowing
the limits of his human capital the player will have an advantage over the owner. The
advantage that a player has is that he knows exactly how well he can perfonn while the
owner can only base his expectations on previous perfonnances. This creates a prime
situation for a player to shirk. Shirking is made possible by the moral hazard inherent in
multi-year contracts and the asymmetric information between the owner and a player
concerning the player's productive potential. As a result, the combination of asymmetric
information and moral hazard suggests that the actual perfonnance of a player with a
multi-year contract could be lower than his potential productivity. Only the player will
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know that he is not doing everything he can do both during the off-season and the season.
When the player is nearing contract negotiations he may choose to stop shirking to give
the appearance that he is a hard worker, with improving productivity, deserving of
another multi-year contract. Maxcy (2002) says that, "we find that time spent on the
disabled list decreases in the period immediately preceding contract negotiations." Since
the owner does not know exactly how well a player can perfonn, this decrease in time on
the disabled list and increased productivity will appear to represent an improving player.
The potential impact of the player's future income encourages him to fully utilize his
human capital and meet his productivity potential (Marburger, 2003). In sum, moral
hazard and asymmetric infonnation create the perfect opportunity, and excuse, for a
player to shirk.
Based on the previous literature and theory on this subject, the research
hypothesis for my paper is that the concepts of moral hazard and asymmetric infonnation
cause a pattern of shirking during the middle years of a contract. This pattern continues
until the last year when a player's productivity begins to increase as the player competes
for another multi-year contract.
However, if management is aware that moral hazard and asymmetric information
can lead to a pattern of shirking, it may take actions to minimize shirking. This could be
done by setting up monitoring systems such as coaches and tans. Other options include
offering a player an efficiency wage or incentives to ensure that he does not want to lose
his job and will not shirk. If management is successful in reducing shirking through
monitoring and incentives, there may not be a pattern of shirking. The purpose of the
empirical model presented in the next section is to detennine whether a pattern of
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shirking remains in a market where monitoring and incentives are used to discourage
shirking.

IV. Data

To select the players in this data set I consulted an archived website that Meltzer
(2005) used in his study. I The one hundred non-pitching baseball players in the sample
have played at least six years in MLB and have achieved free agency. Fifty of these
players had a one year contract and the other fifty had multi-year contracts. The multiyear contracts range from four to seven years and span the years of 1997-2007.
The sample of one hundred MLB players suppOlis the idea that multi-year
contracts are awarded to those players who have demonstrated the best perfonnance.
Table 1 shows that players with higher productivity tend to have a multi-year contract.
Table 1: The Productivity of Players with One-Year and Multi-Year Contracts.
One-Year Contract
Variable

Mean

EqA
OPS
AGE
GAMESPLAYEO
SALARY(millions)

0.76
0.76

Multi-Year Contract

Standard Deviation

Mean

Standard Deviation

0.09

0.86

0.11

0.09

0.86

29.46

3.83

30.11

123.74

29.08

130.61

$2.23

2.33

$34.86

Source: Baseball-reference.com

.10

3.76
27.17
24.04

Of these one hundred players I have included thirty different players with four
year contracts and their statistics in my models. Note that the unit of observation is
contract year. Thus, there are five units of observation for each player, one observation
for each contract year and one for the year prior to the stmi of the contract. The total
sample size is therefore

ISO

(five contract years times thirty players).

I This website has been since removed but it can be found by using the archive website
http://web.archive.org/web/web.php.
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The players in this study represent each of the positions of a MLB team except for
pitchers. Pitchers are not included in my sample because pitching statistics are less
universal than hitting statistics and there are difTerent types of pitchers. The two types of
pitchers (starting and relief) each have different statistics and different responsibilities
making it difficult to measure a pitcher's productivity (Krautmann, 1990). On the other
hand, productivity of position players are all measured in the same way when they are
hitting which offers a consistent measure of productivity (Meltzer, 2005). Another
reason that pitchers are not included is that there are different rules for pitchers in the
different leagues. Pitchers tend to play different roles in each league which would cause
their statistics to not be comparable.
Also not represented in this study is any measure of the defensive ability of a
player. The statistics that are available to measure defense represent the mistakes that a
player makes rather than the ability of a player to make exceptional plays (Meltzer,
2005). For example, the fielding percentage of a player remains at one (which means
100%) and it only decreases as a player makes an error. However, it will not increase if a
player makes an extraordinary play. Without the. ability to measure exceptional plays on
defense there is not an accurate way to measure the productivity of a player's defensive
ability. In addition to this, a player is acting independently of his teammates when he is
hitting. The completion of a defensive play often depends on a player's teammates
(Dinerstein, 2007). In other words, defensive statistics are not included in this study
because of their ambiguity.
All of the individual offensive statistics that make up the productivity statistics are
available from the website baseballreference.com. The fonnula for OPS is
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«hits+walks+hit by pitch)!(at bats+walks+hit by pitch+sacrifice fly»+(total bases!at
bats). OPS is already calculated by the website. Baseballreference.com does not
explicitly state the equivalent average for MLB players but it does provide each of the
statistics that are needed to calculate equivalent average (EqA). EqA is calculated by
(hits+total bases+1.5*(walks+hit by pitch)+stolen bases)!(total number of at
bats+walks+hit by pitch+number of times caught stealing+(stolen bases!3»
(http://www.baseballprospectus.com/atiicle.php?articleid=2596). EqA is a more
comprehensive measure of a player's productivity because it includes more measures of
offensive production such as statistics dealing with a player's ability to steal a base.
As a result, I have chosen to predict two productivity measures: OPS and the
EqA. None of the studies I have read have used the recently developed productivity
measure of Equivalent Average so this paper furthers the existing research by using a
new productivity measure.

V. Empirical Model

By combining the variables mentioned in the previous sections an empirical
model is created that tests the hypothesis that there is pattern associated with a player's
productivity during a multi-year contract. There are also dummy variables to represent
each year of the contract. This is done to detect any shirking that may be occUlTing
during the period of the contract (Berri and Krautmann, 2006). Also included in the
model are two dummy variables to specify if the player's position is the shortstop or
catcher position and a dummy variable to represent if the player changed teams when he
signed the new contract. Dummy variables are included for catchers and shortstops
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because these positions emphasize the defensive prowess of the players. The defensive
abilities for catchers and ShOlistops are more difficult and so time has a higher value
when it is spent training defensively instead of offensively. However, the opportunity
cost of the time spent training for the defensive responsibilities is time that could be spent
on offensive training. As a result, the offensive productivity of these players may be
lower. Therefore, the final model is:
Productivity of Player = a + �1(YEARI) + � 2(YEAR2) + �3(YEAR3)+
�4(YEAR4)+ �5(GAMESPLAYED)+
B6(INCENTIVES)+ B7(CHANGETEAMS)+
�8(CATCHER)+ �9(SHORTSTOP)
The coefficients in front of each year of the contract are relative to Year 0, the year
before the multi-year contract begins. I expect all the coefficients in front of the contract
years to have a negative sign except for B4 which will have a positive sign. This is
because the theory developed earlier suggests that imperfect information and moral
hazard propose that players with four year contracts may shirk the first three years and
then increase their effort in the fourth year. The other coefficients that I expect to have a
negative sign are �7 due to the psychological costs of moving to a new team and lor town
and Bs and B9 due to the large physical demands of the catcher and shortstop positions. I
expect the rest of the coefficients to be positive. The variables are summarized in Table
2.
The last year of a multi-year contract may have a positive effect on the
productivity of a player because the contract is almost over. A player will need to sign a
new contract either with the current team or another team if he wishes to keep working
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with the MLB. In order to be offered a new contract a player will need to demonstrate
that he is a productive player. Therefore, his productivity should rise in the fourth and
final year of his contract.
Table 2: Variable Definitions and Hypothesized Relationships to Dependent Variables
Definition

Variable
Dependent

EqA
OPS

Total offensive value per out
On-base percentage + slugging percentage

Independent

YEARI (-)
YEAR2 (-)
YEAR3 (-)
YEAR4 (+)
GAMESPLAYEO (+)
INCENTIVES (+)
CHANGEDTEAMS (-)
CATCHER (-)
SHORTSTOP (-)

Dummy; I=Year I of contract, O=not
Dummy; I=Year 2 of contract, O=not
Dummy; I=Year 3 of contract, O=not
Dummy; I=Year 4 of contract, O=not
The number of games played by the player
Dummy; I =incentives built into contract, 0= no incentives
Dummy; 1=changed teams with new contract, O=no change
Dummy; 1=catcher position, O=other
Dummy; 1=shortstop position, O=other

Noticeably missing from the model is a variable to represent the age of a player.
Age can be a very strong detenninant of the productivity of a player because as the player
ages his human capital begins to become obsolete. The player is not as quick or as sharp
as he used to be which means his productivity will generally decrease as he gets older.
However, my model is set up so that each productivity observation represents a year in
the contract. Meaning, the four observations connected with each player represent each
year of the contract. The age of the player will be highly correlated with the contract year
variables since the movement to the next contract year is also an increase in his age by
one year. Thus, age is not included in the model.
I run this model using OLS regression to determine the significance of each of the
coefficients to the independent variables. Once the regression is run, it is be possible to
see if there is a pattern of productivity during a multi-year contract.
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VI. Results

Before running the regressions I did a closer inspection of the raw data. By
creating a panel data set it is possible to see each player's productivity across their
contracts as well as the average productivity for all thirty players for each year of the
contract. Year 0 represents the year before the contract is signed regardless of what year
the contract starts, Year 1 represents the year that the contract begins, Year 2 represents
the second year of the contract and so on. The fIrst year that a contract begins is 1997 for
some players in the sample and the last is 2003 for other players. Therefore the unit of
observation in the following table is the player. Table 3 summarizes these results.
Table 3 : The Average Pro ductIvlty (E;qA amI OPS) for E�ach Y ear 0fa 4 Y ear Co ntract
Year 3
Year 4
Productivity Measure Year 0
Year 2
Year 1
-

EgA

0.87302

0.84835

0.84216

0.85089

0.82241

OPS

0.85667

0.84877

0.83520

0.84337

0.81010

Based on these averages there is no concrete evidence that the MLB players in
this sample demonstrate shirking. This result is consistent across both measures of
productivity. The averages in Table 3 do not support the hypothesis of this paper because
there is no increase in productivity during the later years of the contract. In fact,
throughout the four years of the contract productivity tends to decrease. This is
consistent with the results in Marburger (2003). For both productivity measures Year 3
has a small increase in productivity but there is a substantial drop in productivity in Year
4.
One of the interesting results that is evident in Table 3 is the decrease in
productivity between Year 0 and Year 1. This pattern is demonstrated by nineteen of the
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thiliy players when looking at EqA and by seventeen of the thirty players when looking
at OPS. For some reason, the players in this data set tend to have a decrease in
productivity the first year of their contract. However, this change in average productivity
between Year 0 and Year 1 is not statistically significant.
It is important to discover if the difference between each of these means of
productivity (i.e. between Year 0 and Year

I,

between Year

I

and Year 2, etc.) is

statistically significant by running a t-test. If the results are statistically significant then
there could be a pattern of shirking. In the following table
productivity level of the year before the contract,

XI

Xo

represents the mean

represents the mean productivity

level of the first year of the contract, and so on. The results of the t-tests are summarized
in Table 4.
Table 4 : T-Test Determmmg I°fthe Don
° StafIstica
O Ily SoIgm°filcant*
I erence Between Means IS
Hypotheses
T-Test (EqA/OPS)
Statistically
Significant
Hal X >
t= 1.003/ t= .281
no/no
XI

0

1-la2

"

XI

>

X2

t= .222/ t= .457

no/no

Ha3

Xo

>

X.1

t= -.3111 t= -.267

no/no

Ha4

x
,

<

x

t = 1.173/ t= 1.267

no/no

4

*The crItIcal value oft at the .1 level at slgmficance for a one taIled test IS 1.297, the crItIcal
.

.

.

.

.

.

value oft at the .05 level is 1.673, and the critical value oft at the .01 level is 2.396.

The results of the t-test show that there is no significant difference between the
means. The results were insignificant at the 10% level and for both measures of
productivity. This means that the observed difference in means that were found in Table
3 could have arisen randomly.
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To further test if each year of the four year contract has any statistical significance
I ran some OLS regressions. The results of the OLS regression with EgA as the
dependent variable are summarized in the following table:
Tabie 5 : EGq.A RegressIOn ResuIts
Variables

Model A

Model B

YEARl

-.013
(-.636)
-.015
(-.730)
-.006
(-.306)
-.020
(-.926)
.001 ***
(4.582)

-.025
(-1.164)
-.032
(-1.446)
-.023
( -1.048)
-.051 **
(-2.347)
----

CHANGETEAMS

-.023
(-1.351)

-.043 **
( -2.398)

INCENTIVES

.061 ***
(3.636)

.058 ***
(3.227)

CATCHER

-.134 ***
(-3.579)

-.165 ***
(-4.195)

SHORTSTOP

-.083 ***
(-4.472)

-.093 ***
(-4.683)

.370

.281

YEAR2
YEAR3
YEAR4
GAMESPLAYED

Adjusted R

Z

N=150
Values in parenthesis represent T-statistics
*significant at .1 level
**significant at .05 level
***significant at .01 level
The first regression includes each of the variables in the empirical model and is
represented by Model A in the table above. Model A has an adjusted R2 of .37 and four
of the variables prove to be statistically significant. These variables are the games
played, incentives, catcher, and shortstop variables. All of these variables are highly
significant with a significance value of less than .001. However, Model A does not offer
support for the hypothesis that a player will demonstrate a pattern of productivity
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demonstrating shirking during a four year contract when everything else is held constant.
The sign in front of the YEAR4 does not match the predicted signs. In Model A's
results, the YEAR4 variable has a negative sign which implies that a player will be less
productive during the fomih year of his contract. However, the coefficient for this
variable is not statistically significant. This means that in year 4 of a contract the
equivalent average (and therefore productivity) fails to show the expected increase. This
result goes against the hypothesis that the last year of a contract will cause a player to be
more productive.
The fact that all of the contract year variables have a negative sign is very
interesting. This also seems to be consistent with the results demonstrated by the
descriptive statistics. Since the coefficients in front of these variables represent the
productivity of a player relative to year 0 the negative signs do tit with the descriptive
statistics reported in Table 3.
Model B is an attempt to improve the first regression. By removing selected
variables from the regression it is possible to see if the contract year variables become
significant. Model B removes only the GAMESPLAYEO variable. This variable was
removed due the ambiguous nature of the GAMESPLAYEO variable. The number of
games that a player participates in may be correlated with his shirking activity and
therefore the year variables may not be completely accurate in Model A. Once
2
GAMESPLAYEO was removed, the adjusted R becomes .28 compared to .37 for the
complete model. The contract year variables all become more significant with YEAR4
becoming significant at the 5% level. This is a large jump from the first regression where
it is highly insignificant. However, the variable still has the opposite sign than predicted.
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While significant the YEAR4 variable predicts that the productivity of a player will
decrease by -.051. The other variable that became significant in this model is the
CHANGETEAMS variable. Therefore, if a player changed teams it has a significant,
negative effect on his productivity. This result is consistent with the belief that a player's
previous team knows something that his new team does not. The INCENTIVES,
CATCHER, and SHORTSTOP variables all remained highly significant.
The exact same models were run again with OPS as the dependent variable rather
than EqA. The results are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6 : OPS RegressIOn Resu ts
Variables

Model C

Model D

YEARl

.005
(.230)
-.004
(-.173)
.004
(.189)
-.013
(-.555)
.001 ***
(4.437)

-.008
(-.330)
-.021
(-.896)
-.013
(-.555)
-.047 *
(-1.944)
----

CHANGETEAMS

-.031
(-1.616)

-.052 ***
(-2.630)

INCENTIVES

.069 ***
(3.720)

.065 ***
(3.324)

CATCHER

-.163 ***
(-3.976)

-.196 ***
(-4.566)

SHORTSTOP

-.094 ***
(-4.598)

-.104 ***
(-4.806)

.379

.297

YEAR2
YEAR3
YEAR4
GAMESPLAYED

Adjusted R

l

N=150
Values in parenthesis represent T-statistics
*significant at .1 level
**signiticant at .05 level
***significant at .01 level
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The results from the OPS regressions are very consistent with the results from the
2
EqA regressions and demonstrate a slightly higher adjusted R s. YEARl , YEAR2, and
YEAR3 remain statistically insignificant, although signs did change on some of the
coefficients.
Running both of these regressions confirm that the both dependent variables, EqA
and OPS, perform equally well as proxies of productivity. In other words, the pattern of
the regression coefficients was the same regardless of which model was used. The results
of this study suggest that MLB players do not demonstrate a pattern of productivity that
implies they have shirked during a four year contract.

VII. Conclusion

The main finding of this study is that there is no evidence of systematic shirking
over a four year contract in MLB. These results are supported by descriptive statistics
and multiple regression analysis. Table 3 shows average productivity did not change
much over the course of the contract or demonstrate any pattern and therefore did not
offer any evidence of systematic shirking. Multiple regression analysis shows that the
year of contract variables were generally insignificant and where they were significant
they often did not demonstrate the expected sign. Furthennore the same lack of pattern is
seen when using OPS or EqA. All of these results do not support the hypothesis that
MLB players demonstrate a pattern of systematic shirking.
The hypothesis of this paper is that a player will demonstrate a pattern of shirking
during the middle years of his contract. The thought behind this hypothesis was that a
player with a multi-year contract would take advantage of the guaranteed salary, exhibit

23

moral hazard, and shirk during a few of the years covered by the contract. However, this
study offers proof that this is not the case. INCENTIVES remained highly significant
throughout each of the models the variable was included in. Therefore, the use of
incentives will cause a player to be more productive than he might otherwise have been
and may be the reason a player will not shirk during a multi-year contract.
Therefore, owners need to be cautious when determining the contract for a player
because a player that has an increase in productivity during the contract year may be
having an unusual season instead of being a shirker (Dinerstein, 2007). A player may
have the best season of his career, be offered a multi-year contract by a team, and then
return to his natural level of talent the next year. However, the results suggest that on
average, players productivity are remarkably stable over the course of a four year
contract.
By looking through various magazines, websites, or listening to sports talk shows,
it is very common to hear a story about players who are shirking. RepOliers, owners, and
fans all believe that players in MLB will shirk when they have the opportunity. They
may be correct about some individual players but based on this study they may not be
completely correct about professional baseball players as a whole. There are a few
reasons why baseball players are not showing evidence of systematic shirking.
One key reason for players not being able to shirk in the major leagues is all the
monitoring that is available to the owners. The players have many different people they
have to answer to when their perforn1ancc is not meeting expectations. In the dugout and
the clubhouse the players have multiple coaches that arc watching them. Teams
generally have a coach for every aspect of the game. For example, there is a hitting
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coach, a pitching coach, a bullpen coach, and of course there is the clubhouse manager.
All of these coaches make sure the players are doing everything they can to be the best
hitter, pitcher, catcher, etc.
In addition to these coaches, there is a general manager (OM) that is responsible
for the make up of the team. He is constantly watching to see if there is some aspect of
the team that needs improvement. Therefore, the players know the OM is watching and
that if they shirk the OM may decide to invest in different players. Perhaps the most
important source of monitoring, however, is done by the fans themselves. Fans come to
the parks to see the team and they want to see a win. It is very easy for fans to express
their approval or disapproval by not attending the games or buying the players'
merchandise. Both attendance and merchandise sales make up a large part of a player's
salary so in order to ensure that these actions continue and his salary remains high he
needs to perform the best that he can. Otherwise, fans may no longer suppOli him if they
believe that he is a shirker.
Another reason that players may not be shirking is because owners may have
discovered how to effectively utilize incentives. The players that may need the incentive
the most are the star players that have a higher potential productivity than the average
player. As a result, they can get away with shirking easier because their productivity
even with shirking will most likely still be higher than the average productivity. Owners
may have discovered this "trick." By offering incentives to the star players the owner is
providing a reason for the players to play at their potential productivity. These incentives
could discourage the players from systematic shirking by rewarding exceptional
productivity.
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A third possible reason that players may not be shirking combines the ideas of the
efficiency wage and job security. The career of MLB players seems to be somewhat
secure due to the smaller supply of people available with the necessary skills. However,
there is less job security in this profession than is commonly accepted. Teams are finding
new "stars" every year from the draft and other teams. These new stars could easily
replace any player that is currently on the team. The fear of being replaced by another
player can be enough to cause players to perform to the best of their abilities in order to
not be replaced. In other words, it encourages the players to not shirk. The incentive to
receive the benefits or recontracting will dominate the incentive for players to shirk
during the contract year (Marburger, 2003). Another reason there is some lack of job
security for MLB players is the risk of injury or being released from the team. MLB
players have a very specific skill set that cannot be applied to jobs outside of baseball.
The threat of a career ending injury or being released can cause players to work as hard
as they can during their career to earn as much income as possible in order to be
protected in case one of these situations occur. Once again, the players are encouraged to
not systematically shirk.
Adding to the idea of job security is the idea of an efficiency wage. It is common
knowledge that the wages that are paid to professional athletes are generally very high.
This may be because the owners are offering the players an efficiency wage. The basic
idea is that the "above market" wage will cause highly skilled players to work harder and
become more productive. The market cleming wage may not be a strong enough
incentive for the players to be productive. However, the higher wages create a strong
incentive to be more productive since along with the higher wages comes a bigger threat
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of unemployment. The et1iciency wage that players may receive will cause an excess in
supply of baseball players and therefore a higher threat of unemployment (McConnell,
2009). The et1iciency wage becomes a strong incentive for players to not shirk.
Also dominating MLB players' desire to shirk may be the knowledge that they are
getting older. The older players get, the harder it will be for the players to start over with
a new team. As they age, the players will begin to lose some of the skills that they had
while they were younger. This knowledge that they will have to stmi over with a new
team may push players to stay with the team they are on and work hard (Strober, 1990).
A final reason, and perhaps the reason that everyone would like to be true, could
be that MLB players have a strong desire to win. Players in MLB tend to have a very
competitive attitude and they are not happy when their team does not perform well
(Singell, 1993). A team does not perform well when there are players who are not
producing as much as they should and are purposely shirking. The desire to win a gmne
pushes players to perfonn as well as they can in order to achieve the satisfaction of a
victory. Not only does it encourage players to perfonn as well as they can, but it also is
an incentive to encourage their teammates to not shirk. The strong desire to win may be
the best reason that players have to not shirk.
One way to further this research is to find a larger sample of players to use. By
increasing the sample size the results will be more representative of the league as a whole
and it provides the opportunity to compare players who have incentives built into their
contracts to those who do not. One might expect the players without incentives to
possibly demonstrate a pattern of shirking. This will help determine which players in
particular are more likely to shirk during their contract.
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The results of this study suggest that MLB players do not demonstrate a pattern of
systematic shirking. This could be for any of the reasons above or it could be that players
are beginning to find ways to hide their shirking from fans, owners, and even from
showing up in the statistics. Further studies could attempt to capture the effect of
shirking during the off-season which may have a strong impact on how well a player
perfonns during the season. With further work done on the issue, it may be found that
multi-year contracts are not maximizing the productivity of the players but based on this
study owners may be benefiting from offering multi-year contracts. Hopefully MLB
players will continue to show this trend due to their desire to be the best and represent
their fans.

28

Works Cited
Allen, Douglas W. and Lueck, Dean. Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts.
American Economic Review,1995,vol. 85 (2),pp. 447-51.

Baker, George P., Jensen, Michael C. and Murphy, Kevin J. Compensation and
Incentives: Practice vs. Theory. Journal o.lFinance,63 (3),1988,pp. 593-616.
Berri, David J. and Krautmann, Anthony C. Shirking on the Court: Testing for the
Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay. Economic Inquiry,44 (3),2006,pp. 53646.

Chiappori, Pierre Andre, and Salanie, B ernard. Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of
Some Recent Work. CES(lo, 2002.
Dinerstein, Michael. Free Agency and Contract Options: How Major League Baseball
Teams Value Players. 2005,Depatiment of Economics, Stanford University, CA.
Kahn, Lawrence. Free Agency, Long-Term Contracts and Compensation in Major
League Baseball. The Re1'ievl' o.fEconomics and Statistics,75 (1),1993,pp. 157164.

Krautmann, Anthony C. Shirking or Stochastic Productivity in Major League Baseball.
Southern Economic Association,56 (4),pp. 961-968.

Krautmann, Anthony C. and Oppenheimer, Margaret. Contract Length and the Return to
Performance in Major League Baseball. Journal o.l Sports Economics,3 (6),2002,
pp. 6-17

.

Marburger, Daniel R. Does the Assignment of Property Rights Encourage or Discourage
Shirking?: Evidence From Major League Baseball. Journal o.l Sports Economics,
4 (19),2003,pp. 19-34.

29

Maxcy, Joel. Motivating Long-Term Employment Contracts: Risk Management in Major
League Baseball. Managerial and Decision Economics,vol.

25,2004,

pp.

109-

120.

Maxcy, Joel, Fort, Rodney D., and Krautmann, Anthony C. The Effectiveness of
Incentive Mechanisms in Major League Baseball. Journal oISports Economics,
3 (3),2002,pp. 246-255.

McConnell, Campbell R.

Contemporary Labor Economics. The McGraw Hill

2009.

Companies.
Meltzer, Josh. Average Salary and Contract Length in Major League Baseball: When
Do They Diverge?

2005,Department

of Economics, Stanford University, CA.

Pindyck, Robert S, and Daniel L. Rubintleld.

2005.

Microeconomics, 61h Edition.

Prentice Hall.
Singell, Larry D. Managers, Specific Human Capital, and Firm Productivity in Major
League Baseball. Atlantic Economic Journal,

21 (3),2001,

pp.

47-59.

Strober, Myra H. Human Capital Theory: Implications for HR Managers. Industrial
Relations, 29 (2),1990, pp. 214-239.

Tarman, Andrew. The Effect of Monopsony Power in Major League Baseball on the
Salaries of Players with Less than Six Years in the Majors. IWU Department of
Economics,

2005.

Data Sources

Baseball Reference:

http://www baseball-referenec.eoml
.

MLB Contracts:
http://web.archi ve.org/web/* /http://www.bluemanc.demon.co.uk/baseball/mlbcontracts.htm

30

